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INTRODUCTION 
How should governments provide financial assistance to disaster 
victims in order to maximize their satisfaction? What are the key 
factors that influence whether victims think the facility created to 
process and resolve their claims for disaster compensation is fair?  
Of course, a priority when a disaster occurs is to get the victims 
back on their feet.1 States are increasingly called upon to provide 
financial assistance to those affected by natural hazards. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) has provided nearly 
US$10.5 billion to Hurricane Katrina victims.2 After the 1993 great 
floods in the American Midwest, the US Congress reimbursed more 
than US$6 billion for property damage.3 A few hundred miles north, 

1. The term disaster (or catastrophe) generally designates an event or situation that has a 
very low probability of materializing and that, if it occurs, will generate great and sudden 
harm, thereby overwhelming local capacities and necessitating external assistance. See 
VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS – A COMPARATIVE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 6 (2010); Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating 
the Intersection of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 1787-88 
(2011). 
2. See Louisiana Hurricane Katrina (DR-1603), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY 
(June 17, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/disaster/1603?page=3%2C0%2C4#tabs-1 (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2014). This total includes dollars approved under Individual Assistance, Individual and 
Households Program, Housing Assistance, and Other Needs Assistance. 
3. Charles Theiling, Ecological Status and Trends of Upper Mississippi System 1998, at 
15-5 (1998). 
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in Canada, more than CAN$700 million was distributed after the 
1998 devastating ice storm in eastern Ontario and southern Quebec.4 
Even in the context of man-made disasters, there have been instances 
where governments have stepped in and provided compensation to 
victims and victims’ survivors. The most frequently cited example is 
the Victim Compensation Fund (“VCF”) created by Congress days 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
In establishing claim resolution facilities5 for disaster victims, 
governments face numerous daunting questions: what should the 
eligibility criteria be; what level of evidence should the facilities 
require; should there be a cap placed on compensation; should 
claimants have a right to a hearing or a right to appeal; etc.6 The 
answers given to these questions are crucial, as they will affect the 
perceived fairness of damage awards—by political leaders, the 
general population, and the affected beneficiaries—and this 
acceptance is an essential component of the facilities’ legitimacy.7 
Surprisingly, despite the substantial amount of money 
governments recurrently invest in disaster compensation facilities and 
despite the importance of the beneficiaries’ opinion for the facilities’ 
legitimacy, there is little empirical evidence of what the beneficiaries 
think of these facilities.8 The vast literature on perceived procedural 
and distributive justice has only sparsely penetrated the area of claims 
processing facilities for disaster victims. The little we know comes 

4. Canadian Disaster Database, PUB. SAFETY CAN., http://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/
srchpg-eng.aspx?dynamic=false (last visited January 2, 2014)(Select “New Brunswick”, 
“Ontario”, and “Québec” in “Location”; select “Winter Storm” in “Event Type”; enter “1998” 
to “1998” in “Time Period”; then follow “Search” hyperlink). 
5. McGovern defines “claims resolution facilities” as “a generic term used to describe a 
wide range of entities that process and resolve claims made against a potential funding 
source.” Francis E. McGovern, The What and the Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (2005). I will use the terms “claims resolution facilities” or “claims 
processing facilities” and “government compensation programs” interchangeably.  
6. See generally Robert R. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics 
Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 964-78 (discussing the critical 
issues to be addressed in the design of an administrative compensation scheme). 
7. See generally Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute 
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 131 (2009) (noting the value of studying 
stakeholders’ interests for the legitimacy, credibility and good functioning of a dispute 
system); McGovern, supra note 5, at 1378 (discussing strategies to achieve legitimacy in 
claims resolution facilities). 
8. Cf. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER 
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL (2012) (discussing design strategies for disaster 
compensation facilities); McGovern, supra note 5, at 1375-79 (discussing design strategies to 
achieve legitimacy in claims resolution facilities).  
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from research studying specific aspects of claimants’ experience with 
the 9/11 VCF, a fund that was both unprecedented and unlikely to be 
replicated in the future. These studies show that claimants were 
dissatisfied with the VCF, that they evaluated their experience not 
only in terms of monetary, but also non-monetary goals, and that they 
expected a compensation award based on tort distributive principles—
that is, full compensation.9 
In this Paper, I present the results of a survey aiming to puzzle 
together these pieces of information in order to fully understand what 
makes disaster victims think a government compensation program is 
fair or not. The research focuses on the compensation facilities for the 
victims of the historic floods that swept across Manitoba, Canada, in 
Spring 2011. I chose to study these compensation facilities because 
they present a more modest compensation facility, whose model is 
more likely to be replicated in the future, and involve a different, 
perhaps more recurring context—that of “natural” disasters.  
Part I sets out the general background about the floods. This 
disaster was selected because it was unprecedented in terms of scope, 
magnitude, duration, and costs of recovery. Additionally, because of 
the potential natural explanation for the event, this case allows for 
drawing interesting parallels with studies about man-made disasters 
such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
In Part II, I review areas of literature on which this research 
builds. The psychology as well as law and society literatures provide 
a context for identifying the reasons why individuals tend to judge 
disasters as “not natural.” These literatures also illustrate the 
consequences of this perception in terms of expectation of redress and 
justice. After explaining the multi-dimensional concept of justice, I 
discuss prior empirical research on facility claimants’ perceptions of 
justice and identify the need for more empirical research.  
In Part III, I briefly describe the methodology behind the study. I 
conducted nine preliminary interviews and surveyed residents of two 
Manitoban communities hit by the floods. Results were also validated 
in a third Manitoban community also affected by the floods.  

9. See Brian H. Bornstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive 
Justice in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 
90–91 (2007); Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: 
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 660-73 
(2008); Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for 
Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 444-48 (2003). 
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In Part IV, I present the survey results. I found that the perceived 
severity and persistence of material damage, as well as attribution of 
cause to natural forces, influence victims’ perception of justice of the 
disaster compensation programs, while other variables such as the 
amount of compensation did not. This finding partly contradicts and 
partly confirms previous research on the 9/11 VCF. 
In Part V and the Conclusion, I discuss the implications of the 
Study in more detail. Essentially this Paper aims at building the 
empirical foundation for the pending policy debate on how best to 
compensate victims of disasters. The results offer strong support to 
those calling for process pluralism, where the facility offers a variety 
of claims resolution techniques to disaster victims, and for retaining 
the tort system above the limits of the government compensation 
programs. Future disasters, natural or man-made, will unfortunately 
occur in Canada, in the United States, and elsewhere. We therefore 
need to consider what approach should be taken to compensate 
individuals that suffer losses and what policies are needed to further 
that approach.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 2011 Floods in Manitoba 
Many Manitobans remember the year 2011 as one of tragedy and 
despair. They were used to seeing the flow of water increase in late 
winters and early springs because of high precipitation and melting 
snow. In 2011, however, numerous Manitoban rivers and creeks 
reached historic levels, some spilling over their banks, flooding fields 
and cities.  
The Assiniboine River is one of the major river systems of the 
province, carrying water from Saskatchewan and North Dakota. In 
order to reduce the river’s flows and prevent flooding along its shore, 
the Manitoban government opened the Portage Diversion, a water 
control structure constructed in 1971 to divert water from the 
Assiniboine River into Lake Manitoba. The government’s handling of 
the Portage Diversion was later criticized, and many argued that it 
caused or aggravated the flooding around Lake Manitoba, thus 
resulting in “artificial floods.”10 Without getting into the details of 

10. See, e.g., JON GERRARD, FINAL REPORT - FLOOD OF 2011: THE FLOOD WHICH 
SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN AS SEVERE AS IT WAS 46 (2012), available at 
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this debate,11 suffice it to say that, with the inflows from the Portage 
Diversion and the Waterhen River, Lake Manitoba’s water level rose, 
and it ultimately flooded many lakeshore communities. To make 
matters worse, in May 2011, powerful winds whipped across the 
swollen lake, creating large waves that pounded the shore and washed 
inland. It took months for the Lake Manitoba water to return to its 
nest. 
In the midst of the crisis, Canadian military troops were 
deployed in different areas of the province to help with the flood. 
Many people, both paid employees and volunteers, spent long hours 
assisting with emergency measures. At the peak of the floods, over 
7000 people from more than 150 communities were forced to 
evacuate their homes.12 The agricultural community was forced to 
relocate tens of thousands of animals to safe lands. Many properties 
were heavily damaged. Victims included homeowners, cottage 
owners, business owners, ranchers, and farmers. A majority lived in 
rural municipalities, but city residents were also affected. In 

http://jongerrardmla.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Final-2011-Flood-Report-by-Dr-Jon-
Gerrard.pdf (“In essence, Lake Manitoba was used as a water storage reservoir to protect 
people between Portage la Prairie and Winnipeg and in Winnipeg. That the Portage diversion 
and Lake St. Martin were used effectively to reduce damage along the Assiniboine River and 
in Winnipeg is undeniable.”). 
11. This Paper does not intend to determine whether the government’s handling of the 
water control structure caused or aggravated the floods. This analysis has been partially done 
by the four different flood reviews commissioned by the government: the Flood Review Task 
Force, Lake Manitoba and Lake St. Martin Regulation Review Committee, the Flood 
Mitigation Study, and the Surface-water Management Strategy. See generally FLOOD REVIEW 
TASK FORCE, MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT (2013), available at 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011flood/flood_review_task_force_report.pdf; LAKE 
MANITOBA/LAKE ST. MARTIN REGULATION REVIEW, FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: A 
REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION (2013), available at 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011flood/regulation_review_report.pdf; ASSINIBOINE 
RIVER AND LAKE MANITOBA BASINS FLOOD MITIGATION STUDY (2012), available at 
http://gov.mb.ca/mit/floodinfo/floodproofing/reports/index.html; MANITOBA CONSERVATION 
AND WATER STEWARDSHIP, MANITOBA’S SURFACE WATER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 
available at http://gov.mb.ca/waterstewardship/questionnaires/surface_water_management/
pdf/surface_water_strategy_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
12. See Manitoba Floods (2011), CANADIAN RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.ca/
donate/your-donation-in-action/past-appeals/domestic/2011/manitoba-floods (last visited June 
10, 2014); Harper Government Announces Additional Assistance to Manitoba for 2011 Spring 
Flooding, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/
nws/nws-rlss/2012/20120703-eng.aspx. 
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consequence, these floods have been the most costly in province 
history: the recovery costs exceed CAN$1.2 billion.13  
Although these numbers might seem low compared to some 
recent US natural disasters, keeping in mind Canada’s vast territory 
and low population density and the fact that the floods hit mostly rural 
areas, the 2011 flooding was a major disaster for Manitoba. It 
therefore called for extraordinary government assistance measures. 
B. Government Disaster Assistance 
As a consequence of the Canadian constitutional framework, 
provinces are responsible for designing, developing, and delivering 
disaster-related financial assistance.14 Since 1987, the province of 
Manitoba has had a general disaster financial assistance (“DFA”) 
program,15 which was expanded in the midst of the 2011 floods with 
six special programs, each of which had its own purpose, eligibility 
criteria, terms, and conditions.16 All three communities targeted by 
this study fell into the geographic locations covered by the Lake 
Manitoba Financial Assistance Program (“Lake Manitoba FAP”). 
The Lake Manitoba FAP first assisted agricultural crop and 
livestock producers with transportation of livestock, flood mitigation 
measures, feed requirements, damage to agricultural infrastructure, 
etc. The Program also reimbursed small businesses for their property 
damage and loss of income due to flooding.  
Most relevant to this research, however, the Program 
compensated residents for damages incurred as a direct result of the 
high water level.17 The Program reimbursed individual claimants 
for:18 

13. US$1.228 billion. See MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 2. 
14. However, since 1970, through agreements between the federal and provincial 
governments, the federal government has provided financial assistance to provincial 
governments when the cost of dealing with a disaster would place an undue burden on the 
provincial economy. See PUB. SAFETY CAN., GUIDELINES FOR THE DISASTER FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS (2007), available at 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/dfaa/index-eng.aspx. 
15. See Emergency Measures Act, R.S.M., c. E80 (Can. Man.).  
16. See generally Flood 2011: Building and Recovery Action Plan, MAN. AGRIC. SERVS. 
CORP., http://www.masc.mb.ca/masc.nsf/floodrecovery.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).  
17. I use the terms “compensation” and “assistance” interchangeably. Although the 
various disaster assistance programs do not aim at fully compensating the losses, they provide 
monetary awards in consideration of the damage suffered, which is sufficient in my view to 
make them compensation programs. It is true, however, that some aspects of these programs— 
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Emergency flood mitigation measures (up to CAN$10,000),19 
Property damage20 (up to CAN$270,000 for a principal residence 
and CAN$90,000 for a non-principal residence),21 
Incremental living costs incurred as a result of forced temporary 
relocation (as determined by the Program Administrator), and 
Measures to reduce vulnerability to future flood damage, such as 
house elevation (up to CAN$100,000 for principal residence and 
CAN$40,000 for non-principal residence).22 
Costs for which insurance coverage was available at reasonable 
cost were excluded,23 as were intangible losses, medical expenses, 
loss of income, and loss of market value. Interestingly, these 
payments were not contingent on claimants waiving their rights under 
the tort system. The Lake Manitoba FAP was therefore not developed 

such as assistance for measures protecting residence from future flood damages—do not fall 
within the realm of compensation, but they are not the focus of this research. See MANITOBA 
2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 104. 
18. See generally MAN. AGRIC. SERVS. CORP., LAKE MANITOBA FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, PART C – TERMS AND CONDITIONS para. 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.masc.mb.ca/masc.nsf/terms_conditions_lake_manitoba_part_c-07.pdf. 
19. See generally id. US$10,231. All amounts are converted based on the exchange rate 
as of May 24, 2011, the day the Program was announced. 
20. Id. Property damage includes costs to replace damaged infrastructure and inventory 
or to repair them to their pre-damage condition, without deducting for depreciation.  
21. Id. Respectively US$276,237 and US$92,079. If permanent protection against future 
flood conditions is undertaken in a manner approved by the Program Administrator, the 10% 
deductible is waived, bringing the ceiling to CAN$300,000—US$306,930—for principal 
residences, and CAN$100,000—US$102,310—for temporary residences. 
22. Id. This financial support is provided either under the Lake Manitoba FAP (up to 
CAN$22,000—US$22,508) or under another program called the Individual Flood Protection 
Initiative (“IFPI”) (up to CAN$100,000—US$102,310—for principal residence and 
CAN$40,000—US$40,924—for non-principal residence). The amount received under the 
Lake Manitoba FAP reduced on a dollar for dollar basis the amount received under the IFPI 
program. Homeowners must contribute 14% of the costs. 
23. In Canada, private home insurance typically excludes flood losses from coverage. 
See SWISS RE & INSTITUTE FOR CATASTROPHIC LOSS REDUCTION, MAKING FLOOD 
INSURABLE FOR CANADIAN HOMEOWNERS 37–38 (2010), available at 
www.iclr.org/images/Making_Flood_Insurable_for_Canada.pdf. However, public insurance 
provided to Canadian farmers—through a program called Agri-recovery—played a major role 
in insurance compensation for victims of the floods. In March 2012, more than CAN$111.5 
million—US$114 million—had been paid under the Manitoba Agri-recovery program to 
farmers affected by the floods. See GOV’T OF MAN., 2011 FLOOD COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 
(Mar. 31, 2012), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011/flood/financial/
flood_compensation_programs_033112.pdf. Compensation to farmers is not, however, the 
focus of this study. 
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as an alternative to the tort system, but rather as a complement when 
it was assumed that the tort system had no role to play.24 
In order to receive compensation, residents had to file an 
application form on or before November 30, 2011, accompanied by 
sufficient evidence and documentation to verify the amount of losses 
incurred. In total, 5573 individuals and small businesses filed a claim 
with the Lake Manitoba FAP, and CAN$48,315,214 had been 
distributed as of September 30, 2012.25 The Program Administrator 
determined the amounts of compensation based on the evidence, 
documentation claimants submitted, and an on-site inspection. The 
terms and conditions did not provide claimants with a right to a 
hearing, nor did they specify any deadline for the Program 
Administrator to render its decision. If claimants were not satisfied 
with the award, they could appeal it to the Building and Recovery 
Action Plan Appeals Commission. The Commission held non-public 
hearings where parties could present new evidence and make 
representations. As of September 2012, 223 awards had been 
appealed to the Appeals Commission.26  
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
The purpose of this Research Study is to explain disaster 
victims’ perceptions of justice towards government compensation 
programs. In Part II.A, I will review the psychology as well as law 
and society literatures, which provide a context for identifying the 
reasons why individuals tend to look for human agency in explaining 
a disaster and why they tend to expect justice and redress. In Part II.B, 

24 However, Lake Manitoba flood victims have launched a CAN$260 million—US$266 
million—class-action lawsuit against the Manitoba government for what they claim was the 
deliberate flooding of the lake during the 2011 floods. In addition, First Nation members have 
already filed two class-actions, in which they allege that governments and government entities 
were negligent in failing to properly design and operate water control structures, and in failing 
to provide appropriate warning of potential flooding. These three lawsuits are still ongoing. 
See Statement of Claim, Pisclevich v. Manitoba, [2013] No. CI 13-01-82597 (Can. Que.); 
Statement of Claim, Anderson v. Manitoba, [2012] No. CI 12-01-77146 (Can. Que.); First 
Nations Sue Province Over Flooding, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, http://
www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/first-nations-sue--province-over-flooding-130336763.html 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014).  
25. US$49,431,295. These numbers exclude claims by agricultural crop and livestock 
producers as well as claims for permanent flood mitigation measures under the Individual 
Flood Protection Initiative. See MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 107-08. 
26. See id.  
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I will discuss the various dimensions of justice and identify gaps in 
our empirical knowledge about justice perceptions in the context of 
compensation after disaster. 
A. Natural or Man-Made Disaster  
Psychologists developed the attribution theory to describe the 
processes by which individuals understand the cause of an event, the 
factors that influence those processes, and the consequences of 
different attributions.27 Although harmful events can often be seen as 
the result of multiple concurrent forces, psychologists have suggested 
that individuals tend to focus on one condition as “the” cause.28 This 
condition can be internal to the self (e.g., the individual’s personality 
traits or motivation) or external (e.g., other people or impersonal 
forces).29 Causal attribution involves a judgment about the 
antecedent(s) of an event. Unlike responsibility attribution, however, 
it does not involve a judgment about whether people’s behavior 
conformed to the legal and moral standards of appropriate behavior.30 
There can be something counterintuitive in talking about 
attribution to something other than impersonal forces in the context of 
flooding—an event we often label as a “natural” disaster. In common 
language, we refer to some disasters as “natural” and others as “man-
made,” thereby suggesting that it is possible to classify disasters 

27. Yoshitaka Kumagai et al., Why Are Natural Disasters Not “Natural” for Victims?, 
26 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 106, 110 (2006); see also FRITZ HEIDER, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 296 (1958); Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, 
From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222-37 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1965); Harold H. 
Kelley, Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, 15 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 192 (1967) 
(developing the attribution theory to describe the processes through which individuals try to 
master the causal structure of their environment). 
28. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 146-47 (1991). 
29. Kumagai et al., supra note 27, at 110; see also KELLY G. SHAVER, THE 
ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 138 
(1985); Joel T. Johnson & Jerome Drobny, Proximity Biases in the Attribution of Civil 
Liability, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 283, 288 (1985). 
30. Kumagai et al., supra note 27, at 110; see also SHAVER, supra note 29, at 87; Dan 
Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 655 (1980); Frank D. Fincham & Joseph M. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsibility: From 
Man the Scientist to Man as Lawyer, 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.  81, 
104-06 (1980); Kathleen M. McGraw, Subjective Probabilities and Moral Judgments, 21 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 509-10 (1985); Barry R. Schlenker et al., The Triangle 
Model of Responsibility, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 632, 634 (1994). 
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according to the force inducing them. Floods, earthquakes, wild fires, 
and hurricanes are usually seen as natural disasters, while acts of 
terrorism or industrial accidents are commonly understood as man-
made (or technological) disasters. Yet scholars have debated for years 
whether and where this distinction between natural and man-made 
disasters should be drawn.31  
Some argue that disasters must be defined according to their 
social consequences, not upon their characteristics or causal factors.32 
Under this approach, there would be no such thing as a natural or 
man-made disaster. Other scholars attribute high significance to the 
characteristics of the disaster—its origin and time, power, 
destructiveness, predictability, potential for future occurrence, etc. 
But there is no consensus as to where the line between natural and 
man-made disaster stands—or even whether such line should be 
drawn.33 Some have suggested drawing the distinction between 
natural disasters and man-made disasters in terms of degree.34 Natural 
disasters could therefore be conceived as those events that, on the 
spectrum of disasters, are located closer to the “nature-induced” end 
than to the “human-induced” one, but still generally bear attributes of 
both. 
These approaches all assume the objective reality of the 
phenomenon of natural or man-made disasters. However, this 
objective reality might not always be in line with people’s subjective 
interpretation of the etiology of disasters, which is the focus of this 

31. See generally J. Stephen Kroll-Smith & Stephen R. Couch, What is a Disaster? An 
Ecological-Symbolic Approach to Resolving the Definitional Debate, 9 INT’L J. MASS 
EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 355, 356-60 (1991); Jean T. Blocker & Darren E. Sherkat, In the 
Eyes of the Beholder: Technological and Naturalistic Interpretations of a Disaster, 6 INDUS. 
CRISIS Q. 153, 155-56 (1992) (summarizing and critiquing the two main approaches to the 
study of disasters). 
32. See, e.g., Enrico L. Quarantelli, What is Disaster? The Need for Clarification in 
Definition and Conceptualization in Research, in DISASTERS AND MENTAL HEALTH: 
SELECTED CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 41 (Barbara J. Sowder ed., 1985). Kroll-Smith and 
Couch refer to this approach as the generic perspective of disasters. See Kroll-Smith & Couch, 
supra note 31, at 356-59. 
33. For example, experts do not agree on the characterization of airplane crashes as 
natural or man-made disasters. Compare Charles B. Perrow, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING 
WITH HIGH RISK TECHNOLOGIES, 123-69 (1999), with Michael Berren et al., A Typology for 
the Classification of Disasters, 16 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 103, 106-07 (1980). 
Kroll-Smith and Couch refer to this approach as the event-quality perspective of disasters. See 
Kroll-Smith & Couch, supra note 31, at 359-60. 
34. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total 
Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 251 (2003). 
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Paper.35 Psychological research shows that victims of what we 
commonly refer to as “natural” disasters tend to look for human 
agency in explaining the event.36 For example, in a survey of victims 
of a major urban flood, Blocker and Sherkat found that 65% of the 
respondents assigned responsibility for the disaster to human agents 
and technological failures, despite the unprecedented rainfall that 
could have qualified this disaster as “natural.”37 
Sociologists suggest that this tendency to blame man over nature 
is the result of the transformation of our disaster ideology. In 
primitive cultures, disasters were attributed to divinely ordained 
patterns of relationships. In more modern worldviews, and until about 
one hundred years ago, natural causes replaced divine actions. Natural 
disasters were seen as the inevitable result of automatic processes of 
nature. However, in Western countries today, people believe that 
society has the technological capacity to control natural forces and 
that government entities should protect the public from most natural 
disasters. When these expectations are not met, people engage in a 
blame attribution process.38  
This change in disaster ideology echoes the transformation of 
legal culture described by law and society scholars. They have argued 
that collective perceptions of accidents transformed from acceptance 
of the unfortunate and inexplicable to a general expectation of justice 
and recompense for injuries and loss.39 Lawrence Friedman explains 
this change in the legal culture as a cycle of demand and response. 
Advances in science and technology increased the possibility of 
control over nature, and people came to feel that it was possible to 
control situations of peril. As a result, people demanded a more active 

35. The subjectivity of disaster is recognized by Kroll-Smith and Couch in the 
ecological-symbolic approach to disaster they proposed as an alternative to the two traditional 
approaches to the study of disasters. See Kroll-Smith & Couch, supra note 31, at 361-65. 
36. See, e.g., Kumagai et al., supra note 27 (suggesting a conceptual framework, based 
on psychology research, to understand attribution behavior in natural disaster); see also A. 
DeMan et al., Assignment of Responsibility and Flood Hazard in Catahoula County, 
Louisiana, 17 ENV’T & BEHAV. 371, 371-72 (1985). See generally SHAVER, supra note 29, at 
132-36 (discussing how the need to believe in a just world and to protect themselves influence 
ascriptions of responsibility to others).  
37. Blocker & Sherkat, supra note 31, at 153. 
38. See generally id. at 164 (discussing the evolution of disaster ideology). See MARY 
DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF 
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS, 30 (1982) (suggesting that current perceptions 
of disasters have come full circle from those present in primitive cultures). 
39. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 5 (1994). 
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role of the government in exercising this control. Response from the 
government led to greater expectations and changed people’s idea 
about what was possible, natural, and feasible. This, in turn, led to 
new demands for government interventions. The end result is a legal 
culture where people expect fairness in every setting of their life and 
redress for any calamity that happens. This is what Friedman calls 
“Total Justice.”40 
One objective of this Paper is to test one branch of the Total 
Justice cycle: how unmet expectations for control of disasters 
influence demands for redress. Or, in other words, whether 
attribution—to those who maybe could have done something to 
control the disaster—impacts victims’ sense of fairness in the 
compensation process.  
To my knowledge, this question has not been empirically 
addressed before. If some attribution studies inquired about the 
consequences of victims’ attribution—on activism for example41—
they did not measure the consequences on perceptions of justice. And 
yet, there are some suggestions, derived from studies on non-victims’ 
perceptions of justice, that attribution for disaster losses may be 
linked with justice judgments.42 In this Paper, I show that this 
correlation also holds true for disaster victims themselves.  
B. Perception of Justice  
A law’s ideal perceived justness is not always achieved in 
practice. In the context of claims processing facilities, some 
commentators have expressed doubt as to whether claimants obtain 

40. These psychological and cultural explanations of attributive behavior do not mean 
that people’s causal judgments are always incorrect or incomplete. Despite the fact that the 
causal picture of natural disasters is often complex, human agency can sometimes be 
identified, scientifically or legally, as causative of disasters. 
41. See E. Burke Rochford & Jean T. Blocker, Coping with Natural Hazards as 
Stressors: The Predictors of Activism in a Flood Disaster, 23 ENV’T & BEHAV. 171, 185 
(1991) (showing that victims’ interpretation of a disaster as controllable is directly related to 
activism). 
42. See, e.g., Udo Rudolph et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Help Giving and 
Aggression from an Attributional Perspective: Contributions to a General Theory of 
Motivation, 18 COGNITION & EMOTION 815, 817-19 (2004) (discussing studies showing that 
non-victims’ attribution judgments determine their helping behavior towards victims); see also 
MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 11-16 (2013) (arguing that public support for government 
relief has historically been driven by a narrative of blameless victims, or, in other words, that 
attribution of responsibility to victims may reduce public support for disaster relief). 
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fairness. For example, Deborah Greenspan and Matthew Neuburger 
wrote that “[a] system designed to settle claims in the most efficient 
manner may actually be the opposite of what claimants want.”43 This 
research tests this statement by asking what makes government 
compensation programs just according to claimants.  
Justice is a multi-dimensional concept.44 The following Section 
describes the three core justice dimensions—namely, retributive 
justice, procedural justice, and distributive justice.45  
1. Retributive Justice 
Retribution is arguably the most basic and most pervasive justice 
reaction associated with human social life.46 It refers to a desire to 
punish the violator of a rule, norm, or law. Retribution is a way for 
victims to “get even” with the one who has wronged them.47  In that 
sense, retribution is very close to the concept of corrective justice—
one theory of civil compensation. The two concepts have been 
distinguished on the basis that retribution is more concerned with the 
subjective psychological reaction of the victim, while corrective 

43. Deborah E. Greenspan & Matthew A. Neuburger, Settle or Sue? The Use and 
Structure of Alternative Compensation Programs in the Mass Claims Context, 17 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 97, 119 (2012); Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror 
Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 689-91 (2003) (criticizing the 9/11 VCF); 
Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Relief Excludes 
Those Most in Need?, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 58 (2006) (noting that FEMA’s relief and 
assistance proved ineffective for the most vulnerable and marginalized victims of Katrina); 
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: 
Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL  L. REV. 355, 358 
(2003) (questioning whether the 9/11 VCF created distributive and procedural justice for 
claimants). But cf. Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of 
Damage Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 379 (2009) (comparing the successes of no-
fault schemes and those of the tort system for compensating disaster victims). 
44. See generally John P. Goldberg, Doing Justice in the Face of Disaster, 45 AKRON L. 
REV. 583 (2012) (discussing the various dimensions of justice in the context of disaster). 
45. Some scholars distinguish between procedural justice and interactional justice: the 
former being the fairness of formal procedures and the latter the fairness of the social process. 
See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & John S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria of 
Fairness, in RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 43, 45-46 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. 
eds., 1986). However, Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind demonstrated that there is little difference 
in reactions to procedural and interactional injustices, and therefore this Paper addresses them 
together. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE 
RESEARCH IN LAW 65, n.2 (Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton eds., 2000).  
46. Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN 
LAW, supra note 45, at 31. 
47. Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Justice and Legal Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF 
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW, supra note 45, at 3, 6. 
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justice focuses more on what is objectively needed to restore the 
balance.48 Retribution seeks to restore the balance by punishing the 
wrongdoer, and corrective justice does it by compensating the victim. 
Still, these two concepts are closely related, and the pursuance of 
corrective justice remedies is sometimes thought of as a civilized 
transformation of the more basic instinct of retribution.49  
2. Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice refers to whether decisions are made in ways 
that are fair. People’s reactions and acceptance of decisions of legal 
authorities are driven by their assessment of the fairness of the 
procedures through which these decisions were made. People are 
more satisfied with the outcome when they feel that the procedures 
were fair.50 Faced with inequality of power between them and a legal 
authority, people use impressions of fairness as a heuristic to guide 
their compliance or resistance.51 
A growing body of legal scholarship is now interested in 
describing non-monetary objectives of claimants and plaintiffs.52 
There is now evidence that claimants and plaintiffs are motivated by a 
desire for promoting accountability, gaining information, seeking 
changes, and obtaining acknowledgement of their suffering. They do 
not necessarily fit with the often-reported image of self-interested 
rational actors whose conduct is driven by the desire to maximize 
personal gain. For example, in a study about the victims of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, Hadfield demonstrated that some victims’ survivors 
evaluated the tradeoff between a cash payment through the VCF and 
the pursuit of litigation, not in terms of monetary compensation, but 
rather in light of their interests for information, accountability, and 
policy changes.53 Such objectives are often achieved through the 

48. Id. at 6. 
49. See generally id. at 6-7 (comparing retribution and corrective justice). 
50. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 65.  
51. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using 
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 244 (1993). 
52. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 9, at 660-73; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, 
Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
457 (2003) (analyzing the VCF through the lens of grief and trauma experienced by the 
claimants); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, 
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 200-02 (1990) (discussing the considerations that affected 
satisfaction of claimants to the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program).  
53. Hadfield, supra note 9, at 660-73. 
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procedures leading to an outcome, and not necessarily through the 
outcome itself,54 hence the importance of procedural justice. 
Research has identified a variety of factors influencing 
perceptions of procedural fairness. Tyler and Lind classified them in 
three categories: standing, trust, and neutrality.55 Standing—or status 
recognition—refers essentially to the—perceived—opportunity that is 
given to claimants to voice their side of the story. Trust emphasizes 
claimants’ relational concerns, such as feeling that they are treated 
politely, with dignity and respect, by the decision-maker. Finally, 
neutrality relates to claimants’ perception of authorities’ legitimacy—
whether the authorities are honest and consistent, and whether they 
guarantee unbiased treatment.  
3. Distributive Justice 
The concept of distributive justice refers to the fairness of the 
distribution of—generally scarce—conditions and goods.56 There are 
multiple distributive justice principles, and they include allocation on 
the basis of need, equality, or equity—merit or contribution-based. A 
need-based distribution allocates the resources in a manner that 
maximizes the share of the poorest or most needy recipients. When 
equity values underlie the distribution, the recipients’ merit, or 
contribution—their efforts, sacrifice, ability, performance, etc.—
guide the allocation. Equal distribution—where everybody gets an 
equal share of the resource—avoids the necessity of making 
comparisons between potential recipients.  
The conditions under which allocations are defined as just or fair 
vary depending on the circumstances. For one thing, recipients’ and 
allocators’ definition of fair distribution may be different. Also, 
individuals’ preferences for—and assessment of—distributive 
principles vary depending on the good being distributed, the context 
of the distribution, the relationship of the parties, and individual 
characteristics. Research shows that people prefer “equitable or 
contributions-based rules in work situations where productivity is a 
central concern, an equal division where group harmony is paramount 
(such as in church groups), and a needs-based distribution rule in 

54. Cf. Schneider, supra note 52, at 476-80 (comparing the process of the VCF with the 
process of the tort system, in terms of meeting 9/11 victims’ survivors needs).  
55. Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 75.  
56. MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 31 (1985). 
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contexts focusing on social welfare” or in intimate caring 
relationships.57 
Tort principles—under which resources are allocated by the 
wrongdoer to a faultless plaintiff in order to make the latter 
“whole”—do not exactly fit within these three values of distributive 
justice. Wrongdoers are required to pay for plaintiffs’ loss of income, 
medical expenses, and non-monetary losses. Parity and equal 
treatment between plaintiffs is not really a concern for tort 
distribution. The need principle plays a very modest role in tort 
distribution. Although harms and injury may sometimes be a reliable 
proxy for need, the tort system more realistically focuses on losses 
rather than needs. In fact, because of the high value placed on 
individualized calculation of loss, higher-earning victims can (and 
generally will) receive greater awards than lower earners. In that 
sense, equity principles mainly shape the calculation of tort awards.58 
4. Emerging Issues and the Need for Empirical Research 
In this Paper, I test justice theories in a novel context, that of 
government compensation after disasters. Although a large body of 
research now exists on procedural justice, it generally focuses on 
perceptions of individual litigants involved in civil or criminal 
disputes, or in alternative dispute resolution programs.59 Similarly, 
applied research on distributive justice has emerged in the last two 
decades to assess justice perceptions in a variety of institutional 
settings—health care, income distribution in society, tax evasion, 
etc.60 However, with the exception of the work on the 9/11 VCF, 
these studies have not addressed the issue of justice judgments in the 
context of government claims resolution facilities.  
Three studies evaluating specific aspects of 9/11 victims’ 
experience with compensation provide useful insight for this Paper. 
First of all, Bornstein and Poser studied VCF claimants’ perceptions 
of procedural and distributive justice.61 They found that claimants 

57. See Karen A. Hegvedt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice: Recent Theoretical 
Developments and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW, supra note 45, 
at 93, 96. 
58. See generally Hensler, supra note 9, at 425-26 (comparing the tort system’s approach 
to other distribution principles). 
59. See generally Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 71 (reviewing studies on procedural 
justice). 
60. See Hegvedt & Cook, supra note 57, at 123.   
61. See generally Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9. 
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were more satisfied with the procedural than distributive aspects of 
the Fund and that perceptions of justice were correlated with the 
claimant’s relationship to the victim—spouse, parents, others—and 
the amount of compensation received from the Funds—although the 
correlation was only marginally significant for procedural justice. 
Justice judgments were not associated with gender or race.  
Attributive judgments of 9/11 victims were assessed in a 
separate study.62 Results of Hadfield’s online survey of 155 victims 
show that respondents blamed not only the terrorists for the attacks—
on average attributing roughly a third the responsibility to terrorists. 
Respondents also blamed those who bore responsibility for preventing 
the terrorists from succeeding in their plan—US entities and officials, 
airline security firms, etc.—as well as all those whose actions entered 
the chain of events.  
Finally, Hensler studied public comments made in reaction to the 
VCF’s rules draft, with the goal of understanding how people felt 
about compensation.63 She found that victims’ survivors were more 
likely than other groups to use the language of equity, and they were 
even more likely to argue for incorporating tort principles in the 
VCF’s rules. The debate over the 9/11 VCF, she concluded, was 
framed substantially by tort principles. 
This Paper aims at puzzling together these pieces of information 
to fully understand claimants’ perceptions of justice. I test distributive 
and procedural justice perceptions, distributive preferences, and 
attribution judgments, but my goal is to understand how these 
variables influence each other to ultimately identify what factors 
influence justice judgments. 
The larger respondent population for the study reported in this 
Paper—234 respondents compared to 71 in Bornstein and Poser’s 
study and 155 in Hadfield’s study—may allow for deeper analysis of 
the determinants of perceptions of justice. Unlike Hensler’s work, the 
present Study’s inquiry takes place after victims experienced the 
compensation programs. It therefore allows us to analyze what, in 
their experience of the compensation programs, influenced their 
views on distribution principles. 
The context of this study is also slightly different than that of the 
9/11 VCF. While both 9/11 and the Manitoba floods can be 

62. See generally Hadfield, supra note 9. 
63. Id. 
2015] JUSTICE AMONG THE ASHES 263 
characterized as disasters, natural causes must be added to the 
equation in the context of the 2011 spring floods. Also, the amount of 
discretion granted to the VCF Special Master, the VCF’s method used 
for calculating compensation—a modified tort-based approach,64 and 
the almost limitless nature of the resources distributed by the VCF are 
without parallel in the Manitoban government compensation 
programs—and, in fact, in most government compensation programs.  
This Study thus answers the need to investigate determinants of 
justice judgments of claimants to claims processing facilities. It does 
so in the context of a government disaster relief facility, whose 
general model is likely to be replicated in the future for a disaster 
where natural forces could be seen as—one of—the causes of the 
losses.  
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Method 
The purpose of this Paper is to identify what influences disaster 
victims’ opinion of government compensation programs. I 
investigated this question in three ways. First, I conducted 
preliminary interviews with nine individuals who were either directly 
affected by the flooding, involved in the recovery process, or involved 
in one of the review committees. These interviews were used to build 
a survey questionnaire for the second main phase of the study, in 
which I surveyed residents of two Manitoban communities: Twin 
Lakes Beach (“TLB”) and Lundar Beach & Sugar Point (“LB&SP”). 
These two areas were selected because they represent a variety 
of flooding experiences. TLB was said to be the hardest hit area, with 
the highest density of population.65 Both LB&SP and TLB are mainly 
composed of cottage owners and landowners. There are 
approximately 115 households in LB&SP, and 300 in TLB.66 If one 
uses election results as a proxy for political views, the political beliefs 

64. See Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation 
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 738-53 (2003) (discussing the tort and social welfare roots of 
the 9/11 VCF). 
65. See Larry Kusch, Cottagers Clamour for Compensation, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS 
(Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/Cottagers-clamour-for-
compensation-145419935.html?device=mobile. 
66. This information was provided by the Twin Lakes Beach Association and the Lundar 
Beach and Sugar Point Association. 
264 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:245 
in the two communities appear to be roughly divided between 
conservative and liberal views.67 These two areas are located near 
Lake Manitoba and were flooded by water coming from the lake. The 
above-described debate as to whether diversion of water by 
government through the Portage Diversion caused the floods is very 
alive in these communities.  
Considering the size of the research population in these two 
areas—approximately 415 households—no sample was drawn and all 
residents were included in the study. Respondents were recruited via 
an email—or a letter when no email address was available—that was 
distributed by two local associations—the Twin Lakes Beach 
Association and the Lundar Beach and Sugar Point Association—that 
forwarded it to their members. These associations are not specifically 
devoted to flood issues. Their mandate is generally to serve the 
interests of residents in the area, promote good fellowship among 
members, and promote good relations with surrounding communities. 
People involved in the associations believed that their listservs were 
fairly accurate, up-to-date, and included the vast majority of residents 
in the area.  
In February 2013, the survey was sent to 104 email addresses of 
residents in LB&SP, and 321 email addresses and 25 regular mail 
addresses of residents in TLB.68 In total, 450 surveys were sent. A 
follow-up email was sent ten days after the initial invitation. 
Responses were collected until March 2013. Respondents contacted 
by email received a link to the questionnaire, administered via an 
automated web-based survey system. Respondents contacted by 
regular mail received a paper copy of the questionnaire with a self-
addressed stamped envelope. Responses were anonymous; however, 
respondents could voluntarily provide their contact information. 
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67. A majority of voters in the electoral division including TLB and LB&SP voted for a 
more conservative party (the Conservative Party—59.3% of votes) in the 2007 election, and 
for a more liberal party (the New Democratic Party—50.2% of votes) in the 2011 election. See 
Summary of Votes Received, ELECTIONS MANITOBA (2007), 
http://www.electionsmanitoba.ca/downloads/PDF_EDResults_GE2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 
19, 2014) (Select “Interlake / Entre-les-lacs”). See also Summary of Votes Received, 
ELECTIONS MANITOBA (2011), http://www.electionsmanitoba.ca/downloads/
PDF_EDResults_GE2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (Select “Interlake / Entre-les-lacs”). 
However, people with summer homes in TLB and LB&SP might have voted in the electoral 
division of their primary residence.  
68. In TLB, because some households had registered more than one email address, the 
number of households that received the survey is lower than the number of surveys sent. The 
survey reached 308 households in TLB. 
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Finally, in the third phase of the Study, results were validated in 
a third community in April and May 2013. Similarly to the first two 
communities, Delta Beach is located on the shore of Lake Manitoba 
and is mainly composed of homeowners and cottage owners. Results 
from past provincial elections indicate that the population of Delta 
Beach is closely divided between conservative and liberal views.69   
Delta Beach respondents were also recruited via an email 
distributed by a local association. A link to the survey questionnaire 
was also posted on the website of the association. The online 
questionnaire was exactly the same as the one used in the first two 
communities. Unlike the other two communities, however, it has not 
been possible for the association to send a follow-up email.   
B. Survey Respondents 
In TLB and LB&SP, 196 respondents completed the 
questionnaire,70 representing a response rate of 42%.71 This response 
rate is relatively high compared to other web-based surveys72 and 
similar studies on the 9/11 VCF.73 The targeted population was 
successfully reached since all respondents indicated that they suffered 
damage as a result of the 2011 floods,74 and 98% responded that this 
damage occurred primarily in TLB or LB&SP. After removing the 
four surveys from residents of communities other than TLB or 
LB&SP, there were a total of 192 useable survey responses.  
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69. Residents of Delta Beach voted in Portage La Prairie. In 2011, the Conservative 
Party obtained 52% of votes, the New Democratic Party 43.1%, and the Liberal Party 8.4%. In 
2007, the Conservative Party obtained 48.1% of votes, the New Democratic Party 42.2%, and 
the Liberal Party 9.3%.  See Summary of Votes Received, ELECTIONS MANITOBA (2007), supra 
note 67 at “Portage La Prairie / Portage-la-Prairie”; Summary of Votes Received, ELECTIONS 
MANITOBA (2011), supra note 67 (Select “Portage La Prairie / Portage-la-Prairie”). 
70. Because of the sensitivity of the question topics, participants were allowed to skip 
questions. Therefore, partially completed surveys were included when 75% or more of the 
questionnaire was completed. 
71. The response rate was 40% (138) in TLB and 52% (54) in LB&SP. The response rate 
is lower in TLB because of the low number of responses to the questionnaire sent by regular 
mail (5 out of 25).  
72. A response rate of 20% or less is not infrequent for web-based surveys. See Dorine 
Andrews et al., Electronic Survey Methodology: A Case Study in Reaching Hard to Involve 
Internet Users, 16 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 185, 191 (2003).  
73. See Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9, at 87 (response rate of 25.5%); see also 
Hadfield, supra note 9, at 651 (unknown response rate). 
74. Three participants indicated they had not suffered any damage, but their 
questionnaires were excluded because they were incomplete.   
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The Appendix displays demographic characteristics of the 
respondent population. Most of the respondents were cottage owners 
(77%), their most frequent household income was CAN$40,000 to 
CAN$59,999 (19%), and there were, on average, 2.67 individuals per 
household. However, as the research protocol was designed so that 
one person per household—most likely the household head—
completed the survey, personal characteristics of respondents do not 
align with characteristics of general population. Most of the 
participants were male (59%). Respondents were between 28 and 100 
years old, with a median age at 58.5.75 Their employment rate—
50%—was lower than population’s employment rate in TLB’s and 
LB&SP’s rural municipality. A little less than half of the respondents 
(43%) were retired. 
In the validation community, thirty-eight respondents completed 
the questionnaire. The total number of people to whom the survey 
was sent is unknown and therefore, it is impossible to determine the 
response rate. Because Delta Beach is said to consist of about 200 
households,76 the response rate may be around 19%. As shown in the 
Appendix, respondents in Delta Beach are comparable to those in the 
first two communities.  
Overall, the respondents were representative of the population of 
the three target communities. Although self-selection bias is a 
limitation of any survey research, my recruitment method appears to 
have selected individuals with a broad range of opinions and 
background, and not only those unsatisfied with compensation. 
Indeed, responses show a variety of opinions with regards to the 
procedural and distributive justice of the compensation programs. 
Also, the respondent population evidences substantial representation 
of both activists and non-activists.77 
C. Materials 
The content of the questionnaire was developed after reviewing 
the relevant legislation and literature, and conducting preliminary 

75. Statistic Canada 2012 census indicates that the median age of the population is forty-
six years old in the rural municipality of Coldwell (to which LB&SP pertains) and 48.4 years 
old in the rural municipality of St-Laurent (to which TLB pertains). 
76. See DELTA BEACH, http://deltabeach.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 
2013). 
77. See Appendix for details. No statistically significant differences were detected in the 
responses of activists and non-activists. 
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interviews. It also built on similar research studies done in the context 
of the 9/11 VCF.78 It was pilot-tested on Master of Laws degree 
students from Stanford Law School before being sent to participants. 
The questionnaire consisted of fifty-five questions, with a few 
open-ended, but mostly closed-ended questions. It included questions 
regarding: 1) type of damage suffered, 2) claim filed with government 
compensation programs, 3) perceived fairness of the process, 4) 
perceived fairness of the outcome of government compensation 
programs, 5) attribution of cause and responsibility, and 6) 
demographic characteristics.  
The survey was structured with a branching function, which 
automatically directed respondents to the next question that is 
relevant to their reported experience, based on a pre-defined scheme. 
Respondents could skip a question or select the option “I don’t know” 
when they did not recall the information. Respondents who skipped a 
question or chose “I don’t know” were excluded from the analysis for 
that particular section. Thus, although the total number of respondents 
was 192 in the two main communities, the number of respondents 
(“N”) is smaller for some questions.  
IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS
In this Part, I will present selected background data on the 
respondents in Part IV.A, and their perceptions of justice towards the 
government compensation programs in Part IV.B. Overlapping these 
two sets of data, I will then show which factors influence 
respondents’ justice judgments in Part IV.C. Finally, in Part IV.D I 
will briefly present the validation results. 
A. Background Data on Respondents 
1. Damage Suffered 
Respondents were asked to indicate the type and severity of 
damage their household suffered as a result of the floods. Most 
respondents reported damage to property (98%), emotional and 
psychological pain and suffering (98%), damage due to clean up 
measures (96%), and damage related to temporary mitigation 

78. See Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9, at 91-92. See generally Hadfield, supra note 9; 
Hensler, supra note 9. 
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measures (88%). As Figure 1 shows, these four categories of damage 
were also the ones for which reported severity was the highest. 
Seventy-four percent of respondents indicated that they are still 
suffering from some kind of damage, the most frequent being damage 
to property, emotional and psychological pain, and costs of clean up 
measures.  
 
Figure 1 – Severity of Reported Damage by Type 
2. Expectations Regarding Application with Government Program(s) 
All but three respondents reported having filed an application for 
compensation with one of the government compensation programs.79 
Respondents’ expectations regarding their application were 
numerous, and included both monetary and non-monetary objectives. 
As Table 1 indicates, the most frequent expectation was monetary 
compensation, but it was closely followed by a search for 
accountability, changes, and prevention. 
 
 

79. Ninety-three percent (170) of the respondents said they had filed an application with 
the Lake Manitoba FAP, and 28% (51) with the Disaster Financial Assistance Program. Due to 
the extreme complexity of the different programs, respondents’ reports of the program(s) with 
which they filed an application may not always be accurate. 
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TYPE OF 
OBJECTIVES 
ITEMS % OF 
RESPONSES 
 
Monetary Buy-out of property 
I wanted the government to buy my property. 
12% (22) 
Monetary Compensation 
I wanted to obtain money to compensate for 
damage suffered.  
85% (156) 
Non-
monetary 
Changes and Prevention 
I wanted to help change things and prevent this 
from happening again. 
72% (132) 
Retribution 
I wanted those who caused or contributed to the 
damage(s) suffered to pay for what they did. 
63% (115) 
Accountability 
I wanted those who caused or contributed to the 
damage(s) suffered to be held accountable.  
80% (147) 
Acknowledgment 
I wanted to obtain a decision acknowledging the 
damage I suffered.  
61% (114) 
Be heard 
I wanted a chance to have someone else hear what 
happened to me. 
34% (63) 
Other None 
I did not have specific hope. 
4% (7) 
Table 1 – Respondents’ Objectives in Filing a Claim with a Government 
Compensation Program (N = 184) 
3. Compensation 
Participants were asked to indicate how much money they had 
received as a result of their application by checking one of several 
possible ranges. There was a broad range of compensation reported, 
with a mode and a median between CAN$10,000 and CAN$49,999 
(Table 2). Because the compensation programs were still underway at 
the time of the survey, 49% of respondents indicated they were still 
expecting to receive money as a result of their application(s), while 
28% did not, and 22% replied they did not know.  
 
RANGE* % OF RESPONDENTS  
Zero  6% (11) 
$1 to $4,999 14% (26) 
270 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:245 
RANGE* % OF RESPONDENTS  
$5,000 to $9,999 24% (43) 
$10,000 to $49,999 32% (58) 
$50,000 to $99,999 17% (31) 
$100,000 to $199,999 6% (10) 
$200,000 to $299,999 1% (2) 
$300,000 or more 0% (0) 
Table 2 – Amount of Money Received from Compensation Programs 
(N=181) 
* in Canadian dollars 
4. Attribution 
The survey investigated attribution of cause by asking 
respondents to allocate 100 points among twelve factors, persons, and 
organizations, presented in a randomized order.80 This list was 
generated from the nine preliminary interviews. The requirement that 
the total points allocated sum to 100 was enforced by the online 
survey mechanism. Respondents were then given the opportunity to 
rate how much they thought someone was at fault. Those who 
indicated “somewhat” or “completely” were then asked to indicate 
who they thought was most at fault. These three questions were 
placed near the end of the survey, after questions on distributive and 
procedural justice, to avoid the possibility that reflecting on 
attribution and blame biased responses would lead respondents to be 
more critical towards the compensation programs. 
As Table 3 shows, over 75% of respondents thought the 
government of Manitoba was the main cause of their losses. Only 
4.4% of respondents did not attribute any points to the government of 
Manitoba. On average, respondents distributed 73.62 points, out of 
100, to the government of Manitoba.  
Natural forces came next, with an average of 7.66 distributed 
points. An average of 7.39 points were distributed to the answer 
“some equipment,” which thirty-six respondents out of thirty-eight 
indicated referred either to the Portage Diversion—controlling inflow 
of water in Lake Manitoba, the Fairford Dam—controlling outflow of 
water from Lake Manitoba, or the inadequate outlet to offset inflow of 
water in Lake Manitoba. Because the government controlled these 
                                                            
80. The structure of this question was taken from the survey of Hadfield. Hadfield, supra 
note 9, at 655-56. 
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structures, these answers could be seen as additional attribution of 
cause to the government.    
As to attribution of responsibility, 87% of respondents thought 
their losses were somewhat or completely the result of someone else’s 
fault, and 95% of them identified the government of Manitoba as the 
organization or person who was most at fault.  
Respondents were given a chance to comment on their responses 
about attribution. Most of the comments pointed to the diversion of 
water into Lake Manitoba and the inadequate outlet of water from the 
lake. Many respondents also referred to the strategic choices made by 
the government. An example of such comment is: “Government chose 
to sacrifice our beach to save other areas from flooding. They just 
need to own up to their decision.” Interestingly, most of these 
comments did not criticize the choice as the wrong one, but 
highlighted the consequences this decision must have on justice 
issues. For example, one respondent wrote: 
[I]t was a choice between saving the City of Winnipeg tens of 
billions of dollars or destroying all of Lake Manitoba’s 
stakeholders investments. Most of the Lake Manitoba’s 
stakeholders understand that . . . . What we do not understand is 
why we are fed to the bureaucratic dogs when trying to return 
and rebuild our homes our places to what we had at pre-flood 
times.  
Similarly, another respondent wrote: “I truly understand that 
decision, of sacrifice [sic] some to save many, but in an instance 
where this occurs, they should stand up and admit that they did this 
and compensate the individuals who suffered due to that decision.” 
  
FACTORS, 
PERSONS, OR 
ORGANIZATIONS 
MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 25TH 
PERCENTILE 
 
75TH 
PERCENTILE 
Natural forces 7.66 11.38 0 0 10 
Myself or 
someone from 
my household 
0 0 0 0 0 
Government of 
the province of 
Manitoba 
73.62 27.80 80 50 100 
Federal 
Government of 
Canada 
2.62 8.08 0 0 0 
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FACTORS, 
PERSONS, OR 
ORGANIZATIONS 
MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 25TH 
PERCENTILE 
 
75TH 
PERCENTILE 
Bad luck 0.50 2.19 0 0 0 
Government of 
a community or 
rural 
municipality 
2.51 10.95 0 0 0 
Another 
Canadian 
province 
4.52 9.27 0 0 5 
The United 
States 
  
0.42 2.69 0 0 0 
Other residents 
in the area 
0.03 0.37 0 0 0 
Some 
equipment 
7.39 19 0 0 0 
Other 1.86 9.86 0 0 0 
No one/Nothing 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3 – Attribution of Cause  
B. Respondents’ Perceptions of Justice  
Procedural and distributive justice were investigated by asking 
respondents to rate the fairness or unfairness of various statements on 
a 5-point-Linkert scale. There were eight statements related to 
procedural justice, three statements related to distributive justice, and 
eight statements about respondents’ distributive preferences. Some 
statements were worded positively—“I participated to the extent that I 
desired in the process”—and others were reversed—“The people who 
determined the compensation were biased”—to prevent response bias. 
Similarly, the order of statements was randomized by the online 
survey mechanism.  
Table 4 shows the results of items related to perception of 
procedural justice. Although respondents were overall a little more 
dissatisfied than satisfied with the procedure, perceptions of 
procedural justice were generally distributed along the spectrum.81 A 
majority of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the delays, the 
understandability of the outcome, and the standing that was given to 
                                                            
81. Respondents’ perceptions of procedural justice were normally distributed. 
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them. On the other hand, a majority of respondents’ attitudes were 
positive with respect to their degree of participation and their 
interactions with the facility. Also, respondents’ perceptions were 
almost evenly divided between positive and negative with regard to 
trust in the decision-makers.  
 
ITEMS (Į = 0.801)82 MEAN** STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONSES 
DISAGREE*** NEUTRAL AGREE*** 
Participation (N=171) 
I participated to the extent that I 
desired in the process. 
3.3 1.2 27.5% 
(47) 
18.7% 
(32) 
53.8% 
(92) 
Delay (N=176) 
It took a reasonable amount of 
time to resolve my claim.*  
2.0 1.2 69.3% 
(122) 
16.5% 
(29) 
14.2% 
(25) 
Trust in decision-makers 
(N=156) 
The people who determined the 
compensation were trustworthy. 
2.8 1.0 
 
 
32.7% 
(51) 
45.6% 
(68) 
25% 
(39) 
Standing (N=168) 
The people who determined the 
compensation considered my 
views.  
2.5 1.2 55.4% 
(93) 
15.5% 
(26) 
29.2% 
(49) 
Outcome understandable 
I can understand how the 
amount of compensation was 
determined.* (N=179) 
2.2 1.1 68.2% 
(122) 
16.8% 
(30) 
15.1% 
(27) 
Neutrality (N=156) 
The people who determined the 
compensation were unbiased.*  
2.5 1.0 46.2% 
(72) 
39.7% 
(62) 
13.5% 
(21) 
Relational concerns (N=181) 
Representatives of the 
compensation program treated 
me with respect and dignity.  
3.4 1.1 23.2% 
(42) 
17.1% 
(31) 
59.7% 
(108) 
                                                            
82. Cronbach’s alpha value is a measure of the internal consistency reliability of the 
scale. Cronbach’s alpha values above 0.7 are considered acceptable, but those above 0.8 are 
considered preferable. With a scale with fewer than ten items, it is common to find a low 
Cronbach’s alpha value, and it may be more appropriate to report the mean inter-item 
correlation. See Stephen R. Briggs & Jonathan M. Cheek, The Role of Factor Analysis in the 
Development and Evaluation of Personality Scales, 54 J. PERSONALITY 106, 114-15 (1986). 
For the procedural justice scale, the mean inter-item correlation is 0.346, with values ranging 
from 0.147 to 0.713, which suggests a relationship among the items. 
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ITEMS (Į = 0.801)82 MEAN** STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONSES 
DISAGREE*** NEUTRAL AGREE*** 
Form understandable (N=180) 
The forms that I need to fill out 
were easy to understand.  
2.6 1.2 48.9% 
(88) 
17.2% 
(31) 
33.9% 
(61) 
Table 4 – Perceived Procedural Justice, by Item 
* These statements were phrased in the negative form in the questionnaire. 
** Responses were coded as follows: “Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), 
“Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3), “Agree” (4), “Strongly Agree” (5).  
*** “Agree” percentages combine “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” responses. 
“Disagree” percentages combine “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree” responses. 
The trend is clearer with perceptions of distributive justice 
(Table 5).83 A majority of respondents thought that they received 
unfair compensation, both in absolute terms and compared to what 
others received. A majority of them also thought the criteria used by 
the compensation programs to assess the value of the damaged 
property were unfair. 
 
ITEMS (Į = 0.877)84 MEAN* STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONSES 
UNFAIR** NEUTRAL FAIR** 
Absolute compensation 
(N=176) 
The amount of compensation 
provided to me. 
2.2 1.3 
 
68.2% 
(120) 
6.3% 
(11) 
25.6% 
(45) 
Relative compensation 
(N=133) 
The amount of compensation 
provided to me as compared to 
what others received. 
2.3 1.2 53.4% 
(71) 
32.3% 
(43) 
14.3% 
(19) 
Criteria (N=171) 
The criteria used to assess the 
value of damages incurred. 
2.0 1.2 71.3% 
(122) 
7.6% 
(13) 
21% 
(36) 
Table 5 – Perceived Distributive Justice 
                                                            
83. Respondents’ perceptions of distributive justice were normally distributed. 
84. The mean inter-item correlation is 0.703, with values ranging from 0.633 to 0.794. 
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* Responses were coded as follows: “Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), 
“Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3), “Agree” (4), “Strongly Agree” (5).  
** “Fair” percentages combine “Very fair” and “Somewhat fair” responses. 
“Unfair” percentages combine “Very unfair” and “Somewhat unfair” responses. 
Distributive and procedural justice scores85 correlate together in 
a statistically significant way (Spearman coefficient: 0.697, p-value 
0.005). In other words, respondents who thought the procedure was 
unfair were more likely to also think the outcome was unfair. This 
result is consistent with the many studies indicating that perceptions 
of procedure impact perceptions of outcome, and maybe to a lesser 
extent, vice-versa.86   
Respondents’ preferences for distributive principles were also 
investigated. Respondents were given a list of suggested rules for 
compensating victims of the 2011 floods and were asked to indicate 
how fair they thought each rule was.87 Each statement was associated 
with one distributive principle: equality, merit, need, or tort. As 
Figure 2 illustrates, only for statements associated with tort 
distribution did more respondents think it was fair or extremely fair 
rather than neutral, unfair, or extremely unfair. 
 
                                                            
85. See infra Table 7 and accompanying text. 
86. See Hegvedt & Cook, supra note 57, at 96; Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 70-71.  
87. The statements were: “All victims receive the same amount of compensation 
regardless of their damage” (equality); “Damage to luxurious or non-essential items is eligible 
to compensation” (statement reversed, need 1); “Compensation’s goal is to guarantee that the 
basic needs of claimants are met” (need 2); “Only those suffering flood damages who cannot, 
on their own, afford the cost of renovation, restoration, and repair can receive compensation” 
(need 3); “Lower or no compensation is provided to those who live in areas that are known to 
be at risk of being flooded” (merit 1); “Lower or no compensation is provided to those who 
had not taken appropriate measures to mitigate flood risks and flood damages” (merit 2); 
“Compensation covers all types of damage, including psychological and emotional pain” (tort 
1); “The amount of compensation equals the total cost of all damages” (tort 2). The responses 
to each statement correlate with the responses to the other statement(s) within the same 
category (equality, merit, need, tort). For example, the two tort statements correlate strongly 
together (Spearman coefficient: 0.635, p0.0005). However, the different categories are not 
exclusive of one another, and they cannot be combined to form a scale. For example, high 
preference for the tort principle does not significantly correlate with low preference for the 
equality principle.  
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Figure 2 – Respondents’ Distributive Preferences  
* “Fair” percentages combine “Very fair” and “Somewhat fair” responses. 
“Unfair” percentages combine “Very unfair” and “Somewhat unfair” responses. 
Preference for tort distribution does not correlate with any of the 
variables associated with perceptions of procedural and distributive 
justice (Table 6). Only the level of education and desire for 
accountability correlated with preference for distribution based on tort 
principles.  
 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES PREFERENCE FOR TORTS* 
SPEARMAN  
CORRELATION 
P-VALUE 
Severity of damage** 0.018 0.835 
Amount of compensation 0.061 0.454 
Attribution of cause to government of 
Manitoba 
-0.025 0.758 
Attribution of cause to natural forces 0.086 0.285 
Attribution of cause to some equipment 0.102 0.206 
Views regarding responsibility for disaster 
assistance 
-0.071 0.387 
Age -0.097 0.238 
Annual income 0.036 0.678 
Level of education 0.184 0.025 
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CONTINUOUS VARIABLES PREFERENCE FOR TORTS* 
SPEARMAN  
CORRELATION 
P-VALUE 
Household size 0.032 0.694 
Level of activism*** -0.079 0.334 
   
DICHOTOMOUS FACTORS ODDS RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-VALUE  
Compensation 
program with which 
application was filed 
DFA 0.67 (0.33-1.35) 0.258 
Lake Manitoba FAP NA**** NA**** 
Persistence of damage 0.87 (0.40-1.87) 0.714 
Respondents expecting more compensation 0.81 (0.38-1.75) 0.590 
Expectations at the 
time of filing the 
application 
Receive money 1.57 (0.65-3.77) 0.314 
Buy-out 1.02 (0.40-2.59) 0.971 
Be heard 0.82 (0.42-1.60) 0.558 
Retribution 0.76 (0.39-1.50) 0.433 
Acknowledgment 1.22 (0.63-2.38) 0.558 
Accountability 0.35 (0.13-0.90) 0.025 
Prevention 2.08 (0.99-4.36) 0.051 
Attribution of fault ***** 0.509 (0.16-1.65) 0.253 
Male Gender 1.026 (0.52-2.12) 0.940 
Employment status  
Working (full-time or 
part-time) 
1.18 (0.53-2.61) 0.68 
Retired  1.05 (0.47-2.33) 0.90 
Table 6 – Bivariate Analysis for Preference for Torts 
* The preference for torts refers to the score for torts. Respondents’ ratings of 
tort statements were coded as follows: “very unfair” (1), “unfair” (2), “neither 
fair nor unfair” (3), “fair” (4), and “very fair” (5). The score for torts was 
obtained by combining respondents’ coded answer on the two statements related 
to torts. The score was transformed into a dichotomic variable: Scores of 6 and 
below were coded as “no preference for tort principle,” and scores of 7 and 
above were coded “yes, preference for tort principle.” 
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** Severity of damage refers to the score of damage severity. Respondents’ 
ratings of each of the 8 categories of damage were coded “None” (1), “Low” (2), 
“Average” (3), and “High” (4). Each respondent’s coded answers were added 
together to obtain a score of damage severity, ranging from 8 to 32. 
*** Level of activism: Responses were coded not active (0), participant (1), 
organizer (2), speaker (3), and activist (4). See Appendix for details of coding. 
**** All considered respondents indicated that they filed an application with the 
Lake Manitoba FAP, therefore no odds ratio or chi-square was calculated. 
***** Attribution of fault refers to whether respondents indicated they thought 
their loss was theirs or someone else’s fault. “Yes” combines responses 
“Somewhat” and “Completely.” “No” incorporates the response “Not at all.” 
C. Factors Influencing Justice Judgments 
These results lead us to the main inquiry of this Paper: What 
factors influenced respondents’ justice judgments? First, among all 
the variables measured in the survey, I identified several that 
correlated with perceptions of procedural and distributive justice in 
bivariate analyses. As Table 7 shows, six variables correlated with 
perception of procedural justice, perception of distributive justice, or 
both. These variables were: 
Damage suffered (severity of damage and persistence of 
damage), 
Compensation received (amount of award and future expected 
compensation), 
Attribution of cause, 
Views regarding responsibility for disaster assistance, 
Filing an application with the DFA,88 and 
Having some type of expectation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
88. Due to the extreme complexity of the different compensation programs, there is a 
risk that respondents’ reports of the program(s) with which they filed an application were not 
always accurate. 
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CONTINUOUS VARIABLES PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE* 
DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE** 
 SPEARMAN 
CORRELATION
P-VALUE SPEARMAN  
CORRELATION
P-VALUE 
Severity of damage*** -0.545 <0.0005 -0.471 <0.0005 
Amount of compensation -0.211 0.02 -0.161 0.07 
Attribution of cause to 
government of Manitoba 
-0.282 0.001 -0.214 0.02 
Attribution of cause to natural 
forces 
0.403 0.0005 0.397 0.0005 
Attribution of cause to some 
equipment 
-0.052 0.56 -0.067 0.46 
Views regarding responsibility for 
disaster assistance 
0.14 0.12 0.27 0.003 
Age -0.01 0.91 0.109 0.83 
Annual income 0.158 0.10 0.114 0.24 
Level of education 0.04 0.65 -0.024 0.80 
Household size 0.044 0.63 0.087 0.34 
Level of activism*** -0.026 0.77 -0.029 0.75 
     
DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE  
ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE 
Compensation 
program with 
which 
application 
was filed 
DFA 0.33 
(0.12-
0.94) 
0.03 0.60 
(0.22-
1.63) 
0.31 
Lake Manitoba 
FAP 
1.06 
(0.20-
5.49) 
0.95 NA**** 0.12 
Persistence of damage 0.13 (-
0.05-
0.32) 
0.0005 0.30 
(0.12-
0.76) 
0.009 
Respondents expecting more 
compensation 
4.16 
(1.62-
10.69) 
0.002 2.64 
(1.01- 
6.92) 
0.04 
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DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE  
ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE 
Expectations 
at the time of 
filing the 
application 
Receive money 0.90 
(0.30-
2.74) 
0.85 0.59 
(0.19- 
1.85) 
0.36 
Buy-out 0.27 
(0.60-
1.25) 
0.08 0.80 
(0.73- 
0.88) 
0.02 
Be heard 0.23 
(0.08-
0.63) 
0.003 0.12 
(0.03- 
0.55) 
0.002 
Retribution 0.43 
(0.19-
0.95) 
0.04 0.34 
(0.14- 
0.84) 
0.02 
Acknowledgment 0.36 
(0.16-
0.81) 
0.01 0.14 
(0.05- 
0.38) 
<0.0005 
Accountability 0.30 
(0.12-
0.76) 
0.008 0.20 
(0.08- 
0.53) 
0.001 
Prevention 1.25 
(0.51-
3.11) 
0.63 0.98 
(0.37- 
2.62) 
0.97 
Attribution of fault***  2.34 
(0.49-
11.07) 
0.273 1.77 
(0.37-
8.41) 
0.47 
Male Gender 1.21 
(0.54-
2.69) 
0.65 0.87 
(0.35-
2.18) 
0.77 
Employment 
status 
 
Working (full-
time or part-time) 
1.18 
(0.53-
2.61) 
0.68 1.27 
(0.53-
3.07) 
0.59 
Retired  1.05 
(0.47-
2.33) 
0.90 0.65 
(0.26-
1.65) 
0.36 
Table 7 – Bivariate Analysis for Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive 
Justice 
* Perceived procedural justice refers to the score of procedural justice. 
Respondents’ answers to each procedural justice item were coded as follows: 
“Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), “Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3), 
“Agree” (4), and “Strongly Agree” (5). Each respondent’s coded answers were 
added together to obtain a score of procedural justice. Scores from 8 to 24 were 
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coded as not satisfied, and those higher than 24 were coded as satisfied. Scores 
below 8—that is, for respondents who did not respond to each item of 
procedural justice—were excluded. 
** Perceived distributive justice refers to the score of distributive justice. 
Respondents’ answers to each distributive justice item were coded as follows: 
“Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), “Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3), 
“Agree” (4), and “Strongly Agree” (5). Each respondent’s coded answers were 
added together to obtain a score of distributive justice. Scores from 3 to 9 were 
coded as not satisfied, and those higher than 9 were coded as satisfied. Scores 
below 3—that is, for respondents who did not respond to each item of 
distributive justice—were excluded. 
*** See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.  
**** All considered respondents indicated that they filed an application with the 
Lake Manitoba FAP. 
All variables associated with procedural justice or distributive 
justice in bivariate analyses were then analyzed through multiple 
regression.89  
Results show that only severity of damage, persistence of 
damage, and attribution of cause to natural forces were independently 
associated with perceived procedural justice in a statistically 
significant way (Table 8).90 In other words, the association that was 
first found with the other factors was secondary to the association 
with these three variables. The r-square of this model was 0.478, 
                                                            
89. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE 
STATISTICS 113 (5th ed. 2007). Multiple regression requires a large sample, no outliers, no 
multicollinearity, and normality. As to the size of the sample, Tabachnick and Fidell 
recommend N > 50 + 8m where “m” is the number of independent variables. Since thirteen 
independent variables are used here, the minimum would be 154 cases. The size of my 
respondent population is therefore sufficient. Tabachnick and Fidell define outliers as cases 
that have a standardized residual (as displayed in the scatterplot) of more than 3.0 or less than -
3.0. None of these were identified for procedural justice and one was identified for distributive 
justice with a residual value of 3.565. This case did not have an undue influence on the results 
for the model as a whole, as the maximum value for Cook’s distance was 0.075. According to 
Tabachnick and Fidell, cases with a maximum Cook’s value above 1 can be a problem. See id. 
Normality was confirmed in a normal probability plot. As to multicollinearity, Julie Pallant 
recommends not to include independent variables with a bivariate correlation of 0.7 or more in 
the same analysis. See JULIE PALLANT, SPSS SURVIVAL MANUAL 158 (4th ed. 2010). None of 
the 13 variables assessed were that highly correlated. 
90. There was no correlation with attribution of blame to government of Manitoba. The 
very high number of respondents who attributed fault to the government may in part explain 
this. Only 13% (14) of the respondents thought their losses were nobody’s fault, and among 
respondents who blamed someone, 95% blamed the government of Manitoba. 
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meaning that this model explains 47.8% of the respondents’ perceived 
procedural justice. Severity of damage explains 9% of perceived 
procedural justice, persistence of damage 2.89%, and attribution to 
natural forces 4%.91 
Similar multivariate analysis for perceived distributive justice 
shows that only severity of damage, attribution of cause to natural 
forces, and expectations of buy-out statistically significantly 
correlated with perception of distributive justice. The model explains 
51.1% of perceived distributive justice (r-square = 0.511). Severity of 
damage explains 6.76%, attribution to natural forces 8.41%, and 
expectations of buy-out 2.89% of perceptions of distributive fairness. 
I inquired a little further on the severity of damage factor. 
Breaking down the eight categories of damage into material and non-
material damages, severity of damage for both types correlated 
together (Spearman coefficient: 0.529, p<0.0005). Therefore, the 
more severely respondents evaluated their material damages, the more 
likely they were to evaluate their non-material damages as severe. 
However, in linear regression, only severity of material damage is 
statistically significantly associated with the perceived procedural and 
distributive justice.92 It is, then, respondents’ evaluation of their 
material damage that influences whether they think the compensation 
program is just or not. 
 
VARIABLES 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE* DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE* 
STANDARD-
IZED 
COEFFICIENT 
(BETA) 
P-VALUE CORRELA-
TION PART 
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENT 
(BETA) 
P-VALUE CORRELATION 
PART 
Severity of damage** -0.376 0.000
5
-0.3 -.325 0.001 -0.26 
Persistence of damage -0.20 0.032 0.17 -0.10 0.25 0.09 
Amount of 
compensation 
0.045 0.596 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.09 
Respondents expecting 
more compensation 
0.098 0.241 0.09 0.07 0.367 0.07 
                                                            
91. These percentages correspond to the squared correlation part for each variable. The 
sum of these parts does not equal the r-square value of the model because they represent only 
the unique contribution of each variable to the model, with any overlap or shared variance 
removed.  
92. For perceived procedural justice: (a) Severity of material damages: standardized 
coefficient (beta): -0.559, p<0.0005. (b) Severity of non-material damages: standardized 
coefficient (beta): -0.005, p=0.96. 
For perceived distributive justice: (a) Severity of material damages: standardized 
coefficient (beta): -0.433, p<0.0005. (b) Severity of non-material damages: standardized 
coefficient (beta): -0.098, p=0.328. 
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VARIABLES 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE* DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE* 
STANDARD-
IZED 
COEFFICIENT 
(BETA) 
P-VALUE CORRELA-
TION PART 
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENT 
(BETA) 
P-VALUE CORRELATION 
PART 
Filing an application 
with the DFA 
NA NA NA Not associated in bivariate analysis 
Attribution of cause to 
government of 
Manitoba 
-0.08 0.355 -0.07 -0.019 0.825 -0.016 
Attribution of cause to 
natural forces 
0.240 0.01 0.20 0.34 0.000
5
0.29 
Views regarding 
responsibility for 
disaster assistance 
Not associated in bivariate 
analysis 
0.06 0.49 -0.05 
Expect-
ations 
Be heard -0.93 0.30 -0.08 -0.06 0.48 -0.05 
Retributio
n 
-0.10 0.288 -0.08 0.05 0.60 0.04 
Acknow-
ledgment 
0.02 0.86 0.14 -0.13 0.16 -0.11 
Account-
ability 
-0.10 0.32 -0.77 -0.10 0.30 -0.08 
Buy out Not associated in bivariate 
analysis 
-0.18 0.03 -0.17 
Table 8 – Multivariate Analysis for Perceived Procedural and Distributive 
Justice 
* See supra Table 7 and accompanying text. 
** See supra Table 6 and accompanying text. 
D. Validation of Results 
The number of respondents in Delta Beach was too small to 
analyze the results through multiple regressions.93 I therefore 
investigated associations between variables and perceptions of justice 
using only bivariate analyses.  
Interestingly, three of the four variables that were independently 
associated with perceptions of justice in the first two communities 
were also associated with perceptions of justice in the community of 
validation. As mentioned before, multivariate analysis indicated the 
following variables were statistically correlated with perceptions of 
justice in TLB and LB&SP: 1) severity of damage; 2) persistence of 
damage—for procedural justice only; 3) attribution of cause to natural 
                                                            
93. As mentioned before, multiple regression requires a large sample. Tabachnick and 
Fidell recommend N > 50 + 8m where “m” is the amount of independent variables. Since 13 
independent variables are used here, the minimum would be 154 cases. In the community of 
validation, N = 38 and is therefore too small. See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 89, at 
113.  
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forces; and 4) expectations of buy-out—for distributive justice only. 
The association with the first three variables was confirmed in the 
community of validation.  
Indeed, in Delta Beach, bivariate analysis revealed a statistically 
significant association between perceptions of justice and 1) severity 
of damage; 2) persistence of damage—for perceived procedural 
justice only; and 3) attribution of cause to natural forces—for 
distributive justice only (Table 9).94  
The fact that with only thirty-eight respondents I was able to 
confirm the associations between perceptions of justice and three 
variables—severity of damage, persistence of damage, and attribution 
of cause to natural forces—shows that these associations are robust. 
 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE* 
DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE* 
 SPEARMAN 
CORRELA-
TION 
P-VALUE SPEARMAN 
CORRELA-
TION 
P-VALUE 
Severity of damage** -0.641 <0.0005 -0.723 <0.0005 
Amount of compensation -0.143 0.40 -0.126 0.49 
Attribution of cause to 
government of Manitoba 
-0.088 0.061 -0.008 0.97 
Attribution of cause to natural 
forces 
0.293 0.08 0.502 0.003 
Views regarding responsibility for 
disaster assistance 
0.228 0.19 0.062 0.74 
     
DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE  
ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE 
Compensation 
program with 
which 
application 
was filed 
DFA 0.623 
(0.132-
2.95) 
0.55 0.37 
(0.06-
2.19) 
0.26 
                                                            
94. Although attribution of cause to natural forces was not significantly associated with 
procedural justice judgments due to the small number of respondents, results indicate a trend 
that the more respondents were attributing cause to natural causes, the more they were satisfied 
with procedural justice. Also, it has not been possible to confirm the association between 
distributive justice judgments and expectations of buy-out as only two respondents in Delta 
Beach indicated they hoped the government would buy their property. 
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Persistence of damage 0.04 
(0.004-
0.36) 
0.005 0.32 
(0.06-
1.64) 
0.16 
 
 
 
    
     
DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE  
ODDS 
RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-
VALUE 
Respondents expecting more 
compensation 
2.66 
(0.47-
15.25) 
0.26 4.92 
(0.52-
47.07) 
0.14 
Expectations 
at the time of 
filing the 
application 
Receive money 0.72 
(0.06-
8.9) 
0.80 0.36 
(0.02-
6.53) 
0.48 
Buy-out 0.93 
(0.83-
1.03) 
0.38 N/A 0.53 
Be heard 0.74 
(0.59-
0.93) 
0.07 0.35 
(0.04-
3.46) 
0.36 
Retribution 0.19 
(0.04-
0.90) 
0.03 0.17 
(0.03-
0.92) 
0.003 
Acknowledgment 0.11 
(0.02-
0.61) 
0.006 0.27 
(0.05-
1.36) 
0.10 
Accountability 0.19 
(0.04-
0.90) 
0.03 0.4 
(0.09-
2.21)  
 
0.31 
Prevention 0.28 
(0.06-
1.27) 
0.09 0.282 
(0.06-
1.41) 
0.12 
Table 9 – Bivariate Analysis for Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive 
Justice (Delta Beach) 
* See supra Table 7 and accompanying text. 
** See supra Table 6 and accompanying text. 
V. DISCUSSION
The overriding finding of this Study is that damage—severity 
and persistence—and attribution of cause influence victims’ 
perceptions of the fairness of the government disaster compensation 
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programs, while other variables such as the amount of compensation 
do not.95 I will take these two factors in turn to discuss the main 
implications of these findings. 
A. Damage and Perceptions of Justice 
Victims’ perception of their damage impacts how fair they 
evaluated the process and the outcome of the government 
compensation programs to be.96 The more severe respondents 
perceived their material damage to be—damage to property, cleanup 
costs, temporary mitigation measures, etc.—the more likely they were 
to judge procedural and distributive justice as low. In the same vein, 
respondents who were still suffering from damage at the time of the 
survey were more critical of the government compensation programs 
process.  
Of course, there is no objective measure of harm with which to 
compare respondents’ subjective evaluation of their damage. Still, I 
suspect that what is important for justice judgments is not harm as 
measured objectively, but rather harm as a subjective and social 
experience. Even though the respondents all went through the same 
disaster, they experienced it differently, and they remember it 
differently. It is how salient the harm was to each of them that seems 
to influence how they engaged in the compensation process and how 
they evaluated it afterwards.97 An interpretation of the respondents’ 
                                                            
95. I also found that expectation of buy-out was a determinant of distributive justice 
judgments, but this finding is very specific to the case studied. Since the compensation 
programs in the areas included in the study did not offer any buy-out, it seems that those who 
wanted the government to buy their property were more dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
compensation process simply because they did not obtain what they wanted.   
96. Bornstein and Poser’s finding on the 9/11 VCF might also suggest that perceived 
damage is a controlling factor for satisfaction with disaster programs created to compensate 
mostly immaterial loss. Indeed, they found that the claimant’s relationship to the decedent 
(spouse/partner vs. parent vs. other) influenced their perception of both procedural and 
distributive justice. In many cases, it is reasonable to think that the claimant’s relationship to 
the decedent also influenced how salient the damage, or suffering, was to them. See Bornstein 
& Poser, supra note 9, at 93-94. 
97. Objective information about the procedure each respondent experienced—the delay, 
identity of programs agents involved in their case, type and frequency of contacts with 
programs agents, length of decision, etc.—could not be collected as part of this Study. 
Therefore, it was not possible to evaluate how much these variables are correlated with 
severity of damage and to what extent they explain justice judgments. Although I think the 
results show that justice has a different meaning for the victims interpreting their experience as 
more harmful, it remains a possibility that these victims did have an experience of the 
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personal harm as severe, and as more severe than others’ personal 
harm, appears to have created higher expectations of what the 
compensation programs should deliver in terms of procedure and 
outcome.  
These higher expectations were twofold: they wanted to have 
someone hear what happened to them, and they wanted to obtain a 
decision acknowledging the damage they suffered. Indeed, results 
show that those evaluating their damage as more severe were more 
likely than others to expect voicing and acknowledgment from the 
government compensation program(s) (Table 10). 
 
VARIABLES ODDS RATIO 
(95%CI) 
P-VALUE  
Expectations at the 
time of filing the 
application 
Receive money 1.21 (0.51-2.87) 0.67 
Buy-out 2.20 (0.76-6.40) 0.14 
Be heard 2.38 (1.15-4.89) 0.02 
Retribution 1.11 (0.58-2.14) 0.76 
Acknowledgment 2.04 (1.05-3.94) 0.03 
Accountability 1.21 (0.55-2.65) 0.64 
Prevention 0.99 (0.49-2.01) 0.98 
Table 10 – Correlation Between Damage and Expectations 
Score of damage severity (see supra Table 6 and accompanying text) was 
transformed into a dichotomous variable. All scores between 10 and 19 points 
were coded (1), and all scores between 20 and 32 were coded (2). 
These results confirm that it is insufficient to define disaster 
victims’ expectations in terms of monetary interests. Respondents 
with more salient harms were dissatisfied with the procedure and 
outcome of the compensation programs not because they wanted 
more money. They were dissatisfied because the opportunities they 
had to voice their complaints and receive acknowledgement were 
insufficient for them. These findings support previous research 
                                                                                                                                     
compensation process that was objectively different from those with less severe harms that 
could explain their differing justice judgments. 
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showing that claimants to disaster relief programs hope for more than 
money.98 Adding to that, my results suggest that voicing and 
acknowledgment are of particular importance to those who consider 
themselves severely affected victims.  
Is money irrelevant then? Some of these results open interesting 
areas of reflection on the role of money in compensating disaster 
victims. First, the amount of compensation received, as reported by 
victims, was negatively correlated with high justice judgments 
(Table 7). In other words, those getting more money were more 
dissatisfied with the process and the outcome of the compensation 
programs. How can this be explained? When controlling for the 
damage—severity and persistence, there was no longer a statistically 
significant association between the amount of compensation and 
justice judgments. This is important because it means that the 
association between the amount received and justice judgments was 
secondary to the association between damage and justice judgments. 
In other words, those who reported receiving higher amounts of 
compensation were more critical of government compensation 
programs because they suffered more severe damage. Otherwise, the 
amount of awards did not predict justice judgments in a statistically 
significant way.99   
                                                            
98. Similarly, in her research on the 9/11 VCF, Hadfield found that 9/11 victims framed 
their choice between a VCF award and litigation as also being guided by non-monetary values 
such as obtaining information, accountability, and policy change. Hadfield, supra note 9, at 
660-73; see also Tyler, supra note 52, at 203 (reporting the results of a study showing that if 
US asbestos victims were offered equal settlements through a quick arbitration or through a 
longer, drawn-out trial, many victims would choose the latter); KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION 
FUND OF 2001, at 111 (2004) (indicating that over 68% of claimants who filed a claim to the 
VCF for the death of a victim opted for the hearing process). 
99. This finding seems to contradict Bornstein and Poser’s conclusion that the more 
money claimants to the 9/11 VCF received, the more satisfied they were with distributive 
aspects of the fund. They also concluded that the amount of compensation was positively 
correlated with the satisfaction of procedure. However, the p-value for this association (p< 
0.08) was higher than the minimum p-value (0.05) for statistically significant results. See 
Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9, at 93-94. In the case of the 9/11 VCF, however, 
compensation was heavily guided by tort principles. The statute required that the Special 
Master set compensation according to “the extent of harm to the claimant, including any 
economic and non-economic losses.” See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization 
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001). Although the Special Master Kenneth Feinberg modified the 
distributive principles and abandoned some tort-inspired rules, this compensation fund remains 
one of the most, if not the most, generous in history. The average award was US$2.08 million 
and the median was US$1.7 million. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE 
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 202 (2005). The 
unprecedented generosity of the fund may explain why claimants receiving higher 
2015] JUSTICE AMONG THE ASHES 289 
Second, there likely is a link between the finding that harms 
influence perceptions of justice and the finding that a majority of 
respondents preferred a distribution based on tort principles.100 It is 
important to note that the preference for tort principles I observed was 
not influenced in a statistically significant way by any variables—
except for the level of education and expectations of accountability.101 
The preference for tort principles was observed among victims 
reporting various levels of harms, amounts of compensation, 
satisfaction with procedural or distributive justice, and attributions of 
cause. A majority of those who suffered damage as a result of the 
floods—however salient this damage is to them—thought distribution 
based on equity—merit, equality, or need would be unfair. They 
wanted relief allocation based on tort principles.  
This preference for tort principles likely reflects the importance 
of damages in forming justice judgments. The very basis of tort 
distribution is the damage suffered by the claimants. The tort system 
aims at making faultless plaintiffs “whole” by compensating the full 
measure of their losses. Compared to equity, equality, or need, tort 
principles are obviously the most generous distributive principles for 
the victims. However, as mentioned before, when controlling for the 
damage, the amount of money received is not significantly associated 
with perception of procedural and distributive fairness. Therefore, it 
does not seem that respondents preferred tort distribution because of a 
self-interested desire to maximize personal gain.  
It is likely that tort distribution is the fairest in respondents’ view 
because it is guided by a measurement of their damages. In short, 
their justice judgments seem to have been influenced by the salience 
of their damage, and they therefore demanded a compensation 
distribution based on damage levels—that is, the tort principle. 
Because of various caps placed on material compensation, victims 
                                                                                                                                     
compensation—despite presumably having suffered more severe damage—were more satisfied 
with the distribution. As many have stated, however, it is doubtful that such a generous fund 
will be created again in the future. Therefore, it is important to understand victims’ perception 
of justice towards more modest compensation programs, such as those set up to compensate 
victims of natural disasters. 
100. The preference for tort distribution found in this research study is consistent with 
Hensler’s study on 9/11 victims’ survivors’ views of compensation. She also found that 
victims’ survivors—potential claimants to the VCF—preferred tort compensation before they 
even submitted their claim to the compensation fund. Hensler, supra note 9, at 439. 
101. Level of education: Spearman correlation = 0.184, p-value = 0.025. Expectations of 
accountability: Odds ratio (95%CI) = 0.35 (0.13-0.90), p-value = 0.025. The preference for tort 
distribution refers to the score for torts. See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.  
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with higher reported damage were awarded a compensation that was 
more difficult to fit in a tort compensation model. Hence, they tended 
to be less satisfied with the outcome and the process of their 
compensation applications. 
B. Attribution and Perceptions of Justice 
Justice also appears to have a different meaning for those 
attributing cause to impersonal forces, as compared to those who 
thought the disaster was man-made. The more respondents thought 
their damage was a result of natural forces, the more likely they were 
to evaluate the process and outcome as fair.102  
The association between attribution of cause and perceived 
fairness of the outcome could be explained in two ways. First, it may 
be that the closer to the “man-made” end of the disaster spectrum 
people placed the floods, the fuller they expected to be compensated. 
This resonates with the comment of one respondent that “if the 
government intentionally causes the flood, the victims must be 100% 
compensated. If the flood is an act of nature, the government should 
be responsible for assistance, but not 100% compensation.” However, 
it must be remembered that preference for torts—that is, preference 
for full compensation—did not vary depending on respondents’ views 
of who caused their damage. So this explanation may not fully grasp 
the relationship between attribution to nature and perceived fairness 
of the outcome.  
Another possibility, more plausible in my view, is that what 
links attribution of cause and perceived fairness of the outcome is a 
retributive justice judgment. As mentioned in the theoretical 
frameworks, satisfaction with the outcome can be both a distributive 
justice and a retributive justice judgment. Because, by definition, 
retributive judgments demand that someone be seen as violating a 
rule, respondents who thought natural forces played a more important 
role in the disaster had fewer retributive desires. Results indeed show 
that the more respondents attributed cause to natural forces, the less 
likely they were to report retributive expectations.103 Therefore, what 
                                                            
102. I suspect that in a study of a disaster where views of attribution of responsibility are 
more diversified than was the case here, there would also be a correlation between the level of 
blame (attribution of fault) and justice judgments about the outcome.  
103. There is a statistically significant negative correlation between attribution of cause 
to nature and expectation of retribution. Odds ratio (95%CI) = 0.52 (0.28-0.97), p-value = 
0.039. Attribution of cause to nature was transformed into a dichotomous variable. All 
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these respondents thought was a satisfying award meeting their 
retributive urge was smaller compared to victims who saw the floods 
as the product of human conduct. Conversely, victims who thought 
the disaster was man-made were more likely to want those who 
caused their loss to pay for what they did. This possibly transposed 
into expectations of bigger awards, and, as a result, more 
dissatisfaction with the outcome. 
The next puzzle is why those attributing cause to nature were 
also more satisfied with the procedure. Part of it may be that 
judgments about the outcome influenced judgments about the 
procedure. Still, there is probably more to it than that. Those who saw 
the floods more as an act of God felt less need to obtain an 
acknowledgement of accountability from someone. Or, inversely, 
those who thought the floods were the result of man’s actions wanted 
those who caused their losses to be held accountable. Indeed, 
attribution of cause to natural forces, in addition to negatively 
correlating with expectations of retribution, also negatively correlated 
with expectations of accountability.104  
On this need for accountability, one respondent wrote:  
This lack of acknowledgement on the government’s part, and 
their phrasing of compensation as ‘financial assistance’ can give 
the impression that the government is being noble or 
unnecessarily kind, when in fact, they appear to be trying to get 
maximum credit, and minimal blame for the lowest price 
possible, and I find this to be a disgrace.  
For those who thought the disaster was man-made, the lack of 
acknowledgement by those who were seen as responsible—mainly 
the Manitoban government—anchored these victims in a position of 
distrust. This likely impacted how fair they estimated the 
compensation process—a process run by the same institution they 
thought was the cause for their losses—to be.   
                                                                                                                                     
responses attributing between 0 and 9 points to Natural forces were coded (1), and the rest 
were coded (2).  
104. There is a statistically significant and negative correlation between attribution of 
cause to nature and expectation of accountability. Odds ratio (95%CI) = 0.45 (0.21-0.96), p-
value = 0.04.  
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CONCLUSION
What is fair compensation for victims of disaster? This Study 
shows that, for a majority of victims, fairness does not equate with 
maximization of personal awards. Rather, it first means receiving a 
compensation that aligns, both in process and outcome, with the 
damage suffered, as it is perceived and remembered. Victims 
reporting severe and persistent damage expect more opportunities to 
voice their suffering and receive acknowledgment in return. Also a 
majority of victims preferred distribution of compensation awards 
based on tort principles, precisely because they are guided by a 
measurement of their damage. 
Fairness, in the view of a majority of victims, also means a 
process and an outcome that take into account whether nature or man 
caused their losses. Victims perceiving the disaster as man-made 
rather than natural expect an award commensurate with their need for 
retribution and a process leaving space for accountability. 
The most direct implication of this study is to help policy makers 
shape compensation programs in a way that improves their legitimacy 
and beneficiaries’ acceptance of them. In this regard, the results offer 
support to those calling for process pluralism,105 where compensation 
programs offer various claim evaluation options, each of them 
striking a different balance between administrative simplicity and cost 
efficiency on the one hand, and individualized analysis and full 
compensation on the other hand.106 Indeed, as disaster victims’ 
expectations vary depending on how they perceive their damage and 
what they think cause their losses, I suspect that rare will be the cases 
where one compensation recipe will satisfy them all. More often, as 
                                                            
105. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 105 (1990); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Funds and the 
Election of Remedies: The Need for Informed Consent, 31 REV. LITIG. 833 (2012) (discussing 
the need for an intelligent, knowing, and informed consent prior to a claimant’s electing relief 
from the compensation program). 
106. See generally Diller, supra note 64, at 726-33 (comparing social welfare and tort 
regimes); Greenspan & Neuburger, supra note 43, at 116 (comparing the possibility of 
obtaining information through litigation and administrative programs); Deborah R. Hensler, A 
Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass 
Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (1995) (explaining that claims 
facilities can be merely administrative payment schemes or “individualized dispute resolution 
procedures”); Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims 
Resolution Facilities, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1990) (generally comparing models 
of claims processing facilities based on their similarities to litigation); Schneider, supra note 
52, at 475 (comparing the transformative aspects of litigation and administrative funds). 
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Kenneth Feinberg wrote, it will be that “different claims resolution 
techniques [will be] appropriate for different claimants.”107  
Victims who do not perceive their damage as severe and/or who 
think the disaster was mainly the result of natural forces might prefer 
a simplified and expedited process, using predetermined formulas or 
schedules to fix an amount of compensation that will usually be 
lower. On the other hand, claimants who perceive themselves as 
severely harmed by a man-made disaster might rather opt for a more 
comprehensive process that, despite longer delays and a heightened 
proof requirement, offers extended opportunities for claimants to be 
heard and results in an award that is individually determined, and 
hence might reflect more closely the amount of damage they 
sustained. The aim of giving claimants different options of procedure 
and outcome is to meet the varying expectations of disaster victims 
better. 
These results also provide information that might help policy 
makers decide whether to retain the tort system above the limits of the 
government compensation programs.108 The vast majority of 
claimants preferred a distribution of relief money based on tort 
principles. However, creating a compensation program based on these 
very generous principles will often not be possible. In this context, 
retaining the tort system as a residual mechanism of compensation—
for example, for the small number of cases that involve very serious 
damages in what can be proved to be a man-made disaster—might be 
an option to enhance claimants’ feelings of fairness. 
My results teach us about fair disaster compensation, as defined 
by flood victims, in a context where the government was both the 
potential source of the losses and the compensation provider. The 
present results could lead to further research on perceptions of 
fairness of disaster victims in various contexts: a terrorist act resulting 
in mostly immaterial damages, an earthquake with abstract causes, an 
oil spill where a company runs the compensation program, etc. 
Because just like fairness, disaster is a multi-faceted concept that 
often changes through the eye of the beholder.  
                                                            
107. Feinberg, supra note 105, at 105 (adding that “the claimant is in the best position to 
determine the optimum procedure for resolving the claim”). 
108. See generally Rabin, supra note 6, at 974-76 (discussing issues related to whether to 
retain the tort system in administrative compensation scheme). 
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APPENDIX – RESPONDENTS’ CHARACTERISTICS  
A. Demographic Characteristics 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS RESPONDENTS 
 
Gender 59% (108) male 
Mean age  58.06 
Median age   58.5 
Type of property Cottage: 79% (151) 
House: 19% (36) 
Lease: 1% (1) 
Business (non farm): 2% (3) 
 
Number of persons in household – 
Average 
2.67 
Occupation Working full time: 43% (81) 
Working part time: 7% (13) 
Retired: 43% (82) 
Looking after home/family: 2% (4) 
 
Employment rate* 50% (88) 
 
Annual income for household 
(2012) 
None: 1% (1) 
Less than $20,000: 3% (4) 
$20,000 to $39,999: 18% (28) 
$40,000 to $59,999: 19% (30) 
$60,000 to $79,999: 16% (25) 
$80,000 to $99,999: 10% (16) 
$100,000 to 119,999: 9% (15) 
$120,000 to $139,999: 9% (14) 
$140,000 or more: 16% (26) 
 
Highest level of education Grade 8 or less: 1% (2) 
Some high school: 4% (8) 
High school degree: 21% (38) 
Technical / vocational post-secondary 
college: 22% (40) 
Some university: 13% (23) 
University degree: 28% (51) 
Post graduate degree: 10% (18) 
 
Table 11 – Respondent Characteristics (Twin Lake Beach and Lundar 
Beach & Sugar Point) 
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* Employment rate was obtained by adding working full-time and working part-
time responses. 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS RESPONDENTS 
 
Gender 75% (27) male 
Mean age  61.3 
Median age  61.5 
Type of property Cottage: 76% (29) 
House: 18% (7) 
Business (non farm): 6% (2) 
 
Number of persons in household – 
Average 
2.39 
Occupation Working full time: 38% (14) 
Working part time: 19% (7) 
Retired: 43% (16) 
 
Employment rate* 57% (21) 
 
Annual income for household 
(2012) 
None: 0% (0) 
Less than $20,000: 0% (0) 
$20,000 to $39,999: 6% (2) 
$40,000 to $59,999: 26% (8) 
$60,000 to $79,999: 26% (8) 
$80,000 to $99,999: 16% (5) 
$100,000 to 119,999: 13% (4) 
$120,000 to $139,999: 6% (2) 
$140,000 or more: 6% (2) 
 
Highest level of education Grade 8 or less: 0% (0) 
Some high school: 3% (1) 
High school degree: 9% (3) 
Technical / vocational post-secondary 
college: 23% (8) 
Some university: 11% (4) 
University degree: 26% (9) 
Post graduate degree: 29% (10) 
 
Table 12 – Respondent Characteristics (Delta Beach) 
* See supra Table 11 and accompanying text. 
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B. Respondents’ Level of Activism 
Respondents were asked to indicate if they had been involved in 
any of the following activities, with regard to compensation after the 
2011 spring floods: 
I have not been an active participant in public discussions or 
debates (0); 
I have spoken in public and/or in the media about my concerns 
(3); 
I have been involved in lobbying government representatives (4); 
I was active in efforts to change the compensation program (4); 
I have organized meetings for victims of flood damage (2); 
I have participated in meetings or discussions among victims of 
flood damage (including electronic discussions, such as on a 
listserv, blog, or Facebook page) (1); 
I have established or participated in organizations to change the 
way things are done (4); 
I have written articles or letters for publication (3); and 
None (0) 
Responses were coded not active (0), participant (1), organizer 
(2), speaker (3), and activist (4). As multiple answers were allowed, 
respondents were then coded based on the highest score among their 
responses.109  
As Table 13 indicates, there was a great variation in 
respondents’ levels of activism. More than half of respondents had 
either not been active or had a very low level of activism with regard 
to the 2011 spring floods. The rate of respondents indicating they 
engaged in speaker and activist activities (46.5%) may have partly 
been the result of self-selection. In any event, no statistically 
significant differences were detected in the responses of activists and 
non-activists.    
 
LEVEL OF ACTIVISM 
 
RESPONDENTS 
Not Active 18.0% (31) 
Participant 35.5% (61) 
                                                            
109. The structure of this question was taken from the survey of Hadfield. Hadfield, 
supra note 9, at 678-79. 
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LEVEL OF ACTIVISM 
 
RESPONDENTS 
Organizer 0% (0) 
Speaker 10.5% (18) 
Activist 36.0% (62) 
Table 13 – Level of Activism (Twin Lake Beach and Lundar Beach & Sugar 
Point) N=172 
 
